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Abstract
The Council for Secular Humanism identifies Secular Humanism as a "way of thinking and living"
committed to rejecting authoritarian beliefs and embracing "individual freedom and responsibility
... and cooperation." The paradigmatic practices of psychiatry are civil commitment and insanity
defense, that is, depriving innocent persons of liberty and excusing guilty persons of their crimes:
the consequences of both are confinement in institutions ostensibly devoted to the treatment of
mental diseases. Black's Law Dictionary states: "Every confinement of the person is an
'imprisonment,' whether it be in a common prison, or in private house, or in the stocks, or even
by forcibly detaining one in the public streets." Accordingly, I maintain that Secular Humanism is
incompatible with the principles and practices of psychiatry.
My aim in this paper is to ask, is Secular Humanism com-
patible with so-called Scientific Psychiatry, and show that
it is not.
The web site of the Council for Secular Humanism states:
"Secular humanists reject authoritarian beliefs. They
affirm that we must take responsibility for our own lives
and the communities and world in which we live. Secular
humanism emphasizes reason and scientific inquiry, indi-
vidual freedom and responsibility, human values and
compassion, and the need for tolerance and coopera-
tion"[1].
The term "psychiatry" refers to both the principles and
practices of this ostensibly medical specialty. It is neces-
sary to emphasize at the outset that, unlike typical medical
practices based on consent, typical psychiatric practices
rest on coercion. In a free society, most social relations
between adults are consensual. Consensual relations – in
business, medicine, religion, and psychiatry – pose no
special legal or political problems. In contrast, coercive
relations – one person authorized to use the power of the
state to compel another person to do or abstain from an
action of his choice – are inherently political and morally
problematic. In my following remarks I address only
those relations between psychiatrists and patients that are
actually or potentially coercive. In the prevailing legal and
political climate (especially in the United States but by no
means there alone), most psychiatric practices fall into
this category.
It is not only the power but also the duty to coerce mental
patients – to protect them from themselves and to protect
society from them – that has always set psychiatrists apart
from other medical practitioners. This is more true today
than ever, but it is less obvious because it is better con-
cealed.
When I was a medical student in Cincinnati in the early
1940s, there were no voluntary patients in Ohio state
mental hospitals. A person could no more gain admission
to a state mental hospital voluntarily than he could gain
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admission to a prison voluntarily. Individuals civilly com-
mitted to state mental hospitals were considered legally
incompetent. In the old days of asylum psychiatry, the
connection between mental illness and legal incompe-
tence was unambiguous. If a person was mad enough to
merit confinement in a madhouse, then he was incompe-
tent. If he was not so confined, he was competent and safe
from psychiatric coercion.
In the aftermath of World War II, partly as a result of the
Nazi practice of exterminating mental patients, American
social attitudes toward psychiatry and mental hospitals
began to change. Erving Goffman's book, Asylums, and my
book, The Myth of Mental Illness, both published in 1961,
challenged the moral and legal legitimacy of psychiatric
coercions, exemplified by involuntary confinement in a
mental hospital [2]. Journalists compared state mental
hospitals to concentration camps and called them "snake
pits".
At this critical moment, so-called "psychiatric drugs"
miraculously appeared. Politicians and the public quickly
accepted the psychiatrists' claim that mental illnesses are
brain diseases and that neuroleptic drugs are effective
treatments for such diseases. Politicians and mental
health professionals used this fiction as a peg on which to
hang the complexly motivated program of emptying the
state mental hospitals, misleadingly called "deinstitution-
alization." In short, the three events characteristic of mod-
ern psychiatry – the "drug treatment" of mental illness,
deinstitutionalization, and the conflation of mental ill-
ness and legal incompetence – occurred in tandem, each
facilitating and supporting the others. At the same time,
psychiatry – which had always been an arm of the coercive
apparatus of the state – became more coercive and politi-
cized. Politicians joined psychiatrists in authenticating
and promoting the medical reality of "mental illnesses."
The dual fictions – "mental illnesses are brain diseases
effectively treated with drugs – became dogma, and devi-
ation from it heresy. Herewith a few examples.
In 1999, President William Clinton declared: "Mental ill-
ness can be accurately diagnosed, successfully treated, just
as physical illness" [3]. Tipper Gore, President Clinton's
Mental Health Advisor, emphasized: "One of the most
widely believed and most damaging myths is that mental
illness is not a physical disease. Nothing could be further
from the truth" [4]. First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton
explained: "The amygdala acts as a storehouse of emo-
tional memories. And the memories it stores are especially
vivid because they arrive in the amygdala with the neuro-
chochemical and hormonal imprint that accompanies
stress, anxiety, and other intense excitement. ... We must
... begin treating mental illness as the illness it is on a par-
ity with other illnesses [5]. A White House Fact Sheet on
Myths and Facts About Mental Illness declared: "Research in
the last decade proves that mental illnesses are diagnosa-
ble disorders of the brain" [6].
With impressive naivete, then Surgeon General David
Satcher, concluded: "Just as things go wrong with the
heart and kidneys and liver, so things go wrong with the
brain" [7]. The view that mental diseases stand in the
same relation to brain diseases as, say, urinary problems
stand in relation to kidney diseases is superficially attrac-
tive. The argument goes like this. The human body is a
biological machine, composed of parts, called organs,
such as the heart, the lung, and the liver. Each organ has a
"natural function" and when this fails, we have a disease,
such as coronary atherosclerosis, emphysema, hepatitis. If
we define human problems as the symptoms of brain dis-
eases, then they are brain diseases, even in the absence of
any medically ascertainable evidence of brain disease. We
can then treat mental diseases as if they were brain dis-
eases.
The error in this reasoning is that if we add up all our body
parts, the sum is obviously greater than its parts com-
bined. A living human being is not merely a collection of
organs, tissues, and cells; he is a person or moral agent. At
this point the materialist-scientific approach to under-
standing and remedying its malfunctions breaks down.
The pancreas may be said to have a natural function. But
what is the natural function of the person? Theists and
atheists have lungs and livers so similar that one may be
transplanted into the body of another without altering his
personal identity; but their beliefs and habits differ so pro-
foundly that they often find it difficult or impossible to
live with one another.
The truth is that the treatment of so-called mental diseases
is no more successful today than it was in the past. Dein-
stitutionalization did not liberate mental patients. Some
state mental hospitals inmates were transinstitutional-
ized, rehoused in parapsychiatric facilities, such as group
homes and nursing homes. Others were imprisoned for
offences they were prone to commit, transforming prisons
into the nation's largest mental hospitals. Still others
became "street persons", living off their social security dis-
ability benefits. Most idle, indigent, unwanted persons
continue to be incarcerated in mental hospitals – inter-
mittently, committed several times a year, instead of once
for decades [8].
Most importantly, the powers of courts and mental health
professionals were vastly expanded. Before World War II,
they could control and forcibly "treat" only persons
housed in mental hospitals. Armed with "outpatient com-
mitment" laws, judges and psychiatrists can now control
and forcibly "treat" persons living in the community.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:5 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/5
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The introduction of neuroleptic drugs into psychiatry cre-
ated the illusion that mental illnesses, like medical ill-
nesses, were "treatable" with drugs. Doubt about the
benefits of long term mental hospitalization was replaced
by confidence in the effectiveness of outpatient chemo-
therapy for mental illness. This development greatly
enlarged the number of persons classified as mentally ill,
contributed to the false belief that legal competence is a
psychiatric issue, and further confused the legal relations
between psychiatrist and mental patient.
Today, a person whose behavior is socially deviant – espe-
cially if he has once been a "mental patient" – risks being
considered incompetent. For example, if such a person
kills himself or someone else, then, after the fact and sim-
ply because of his act, he is considered incompetent and
his psychiatrist's treatment of him is likely to be judged to
be "medically negligent": regarded as the patient's guard-
ian, the psychiatrist is considered to have failed to fulfil
his "duty to protect" his ward or "third parties" endan-
gered by his ward. None of this was true as recently as the
1960s [9].
To conduct arm-length relations with individuals we do
not know, we must make certain presumptions about
them. The automobile dealer presumes that his customer
is legally competent and responsible for his purchase. The
physician whose patient complains of blood in his stool
presumes that the patient has a disease. The Anglo-Amer-
ican legal system presumes that a person accused of a
crime is innocent until proven guilty, and competent until
proven incompetent.
We are proud of our criminal justice system because it
protects the accused from the power of the state, a power
we distrust because its avowed aim is to harm the individ-
ual. Similarly, we are also proud of our mental health sys-
tem, because it protects the mentally ill person from the
dangers he poses to himself and others, a power we trust
because its avowed aim is "therapeutic," not punitive.
Difficulties arise, however, once the power of the state to
"help" goes beyond offering services (or money) and,
instead, the state makes use of coercion. The justification
for psychiatric coercion is further weakened by resting the
requirement for commitment on "mental illness" and
"dangerousness". There are no objective criteria for either
mental illness or dangerousness. Thus, psychiatric deter-
minations and declarations of their presence or absence
are essentially oracular and rhetorical. Nevertheless, they
fulfil a very important function: they instruct the listener
to assume a desired attitude toward the "patient" [10].
Characterizing a door as brown or white is descriptive.
Characterizing it as needing to be opened or closed is dis-
positive. Descriptive characterizations can be proved or
disproved. Dispositive characterizations cannot, they can
only be obeyed or disobeyed. The difference between the
situation of the person accused of a crime and the situa-
tion of the person accused of mental illness is illuminat-
ing. The defendant has a right to deny his crime and
disagree with his accusers. His insistence on his innocence
is not interpreted as evidence of his guilt. The person diag-
nosed as mentally ill loses this right. His disagreement
with the psychiatrist is interpreted as "lack of insight into
his illness" or "denial of his illness". His insistence on his
sanity is interpreted as evidence of his insanity.
Psychiatrists use the term "competent" as if they were
identifying a "mental condition" in the designated person.
That is why courts request the psychiatrist to examine
defendants for competence, as if they were looking for
and finding, or not finding, certain facts. Psychiatric "find-
ings," however, especially in a forensic setting, are not
facts but recommendations for a course of action toward
the defendant.
Ironically, it is precisely because the American system of
criminal justice is so intensely concerned with protecting
innocent persons from punishment that it is especially
vulnerable to corruption by excuses couched in terms of
psychiatric disabilities and coercions justified as psychiat-
ric treatments. The root of the problem lies largely in the
concepts of mental illness and dangerousness, and partly
in the doctrine of mens rea, sound mind.
The legal doctrine of mens rea, sound mind, which holds
that unlawful behavior constitutes a crime only if it is
committed by an actor who possesses a "guilty mind" –
that is, whose "mind" can be held responsible (because it
knows right from wrong), also works to strip the person
incriminated as mentally ill of his rights. Since the Middle
Ages and before, insane persons – perceived as similar to
"wild beasts" – have been regarded as lacking mens rea.
This is why "infants, idiots, and the insane" – in John
Locke's famous phrase, repeated unchanged ever since –
are not prosecuted or punished by the criminal law, but
instead are restrained, as minors and as mad, by family
courts and mental health laws.
Treating mentally ill persons as if they were like children
fails to take into account the many obvious differences
between them. Minority is an objectively defined (chron-
ological) condition and a legal status. Mental illness is
neither. Children are, by definition, under tutelage. Few
mental patients are under tutelage and those that are, are
in that status not because they are mentally ill but because
they are declared to be legally incompetent.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:5 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/5
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I maintain that "mental illness" is not something the
patient has, it is something he is. The modern psychiatrist
is likely to view Lady Macbeth as insane, the victim of
manic depressive psychosis, an illness that renders her not
responsible for her crimes. Shakespeare viewed her as
"Not so sick...as troubled with thick coming fancies," for
which "more she needs the divine than the physician"
[11]. Ironically, today's Lady Macbeths, female and male
alike, receive the ministrations of divines, albeit they are
called "medical doctors" and are licensed physicians (or
pseudo-physicians, called "mental health professionals").
I interpret this as a symptom of the transformation of the
theocratic state into the therapeutic state.
In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville warned:
"The species of oppression by which democratic nations
are menaced is unlike anything that ever before existed in
the world ... Above this race of men [incessantly endeav-
oring to procure their petty and paltry pleasures] stands an
immense and tutelary power, which takes upon itself
alone to secure their gratifications and to watch over their
fate. ... For their happiness such a government willingly
labors ... provides for their security ... facilitates their
pleasures, manages their principal concerns..." [12].
Did Tocqueville foresee the coming of pharmacracy, that
is, government informed and legitimized not by gods
(theocracy), social position (aristocracy), or popular sov-
ereignty (democracy), but by medicine and its ideology
that tends to define human problems as "diseases," cura-
ble by coercions defined as "treatments"? Evidence for the
medicalization of every kind of undesirable behavior
abounds.
I first proposed the term "pharmacracy" in 1974, to com-
plete a triad of phrases to identify that we are in the proc-
ess of a profound cultural transformation [13]. Prior to
World War II, the American system of social controls
rested on Christian moral values and was enforced by a
judicial apparatus based on English common law, the
Constitution, and the rule of law. Since then, our system
of social controls has become increasingly dependent on
the principles of a politicized medicine, and has been
legitimized and enforced by a complex state apparatus
that commingles the principles and practices of paternal-
istic "therapy," punitive psychiatry, collectivistic public
health, and the criminal justice system.
To articulate this insight, in 1960 I proposed the phrase
"myth of mental illness." The term was intended to lay
bare that the phenomena we so label are neither mental
nor illnesses, and that the measures used to remedy them
are not treatments but efforts to tranquilize, pacify, and
subdue the disturbing person [14]. In 1963, I proposed
the term "therapeutic state" to identify the transformation
of our dominant political ideology from a democratic
welfare state legitimized by the rule of law into an auto-
cratic therapeutic state legitimized by psychiatry as a
branch of medicine.
Finally, in 1974, in Ceremonial Chemistry, I wrote: "Inas-
much as we have words to describe medicine as a healing
art, but have none to describe it as a method of social con-
trol or political rule, we must first give it a name. I propose
that we call it pharmacracy, from the Greek roots pharma-
kon, for 'medicine' or 'drug,' and kratein, for 'to rule' or 'to
control.' ... As theocracy is rule by God or priests, and
democracy is rule by the people or the majority, so phar-
macracy is rule by medicine or physicians" [15]. In a the-
ocracy, people perceive all manner of human problems as
religious in nature, susceptible to religious remedies. Sim-
ilarly, in a pharmacracy people perceive all manner of
human problems as medical in nature, susceptible to
medical remedies.
Perceptive writers – for example, Samuel Butler, Aldous
Huxley, C. S. Lewis, and Adolfo Bioy Casares – foresaw
this trend and described some of the features of the thera-
peutic state and the pharmacratic controls that character-
ize it. In his satirical dystopia, Erewhon  (1872), Butler
wrote: "As I have already said, these [persons we regard as
criminals], though not judicially punishable, are recog-
nized as requiring correction. Accordingly, there exists a
class of men trained in soul-craft, whom they call straight-
eners, as nearly as I can translate a word which literally
means "one who bends back the crooked." ... Indeed, the
straighteners have gone so far as to give names from the
hypothetical language (as taught at the College of Unrea-
son) to all known forms of mental indisposition, and to
classify them according to a system of their own, which,
though I could not understand it..." [16].
In Erewhon Revisited (1901), Butler presciently debunked
the now virtually unchallenged poppycock that psycho-
tropic drugs "cure" bad behavior. He wrote: "No more
swearing. No more bad language of any kind. A lamb-like
temper ensured in about twenty minutes, by a single does
of one of our spiritual indigestion tabloids. In cases of all
the more ordinary moral ailments, from simple lying to
homicidal mania, in cases again of tendency to hatred,
malice, and uncharitableness ... our spiritual indigestion
tabloids will afford unfailing and immediate relief" [17].
Toward the end of Brave New World (1932) – the world in
which all conflicts and discomforts have been eliminated
– the human remnant Huxley calls the Savage, and the
dictator whom Huxley calls the Controller, Mustapha
Mond, engage in the following dialogue: "We prefer to do
things comfortably" [said the Controller]./"But I don't
want comfort. I want God, I want poetry, I want real dan-Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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ger, I want freedom, I want goodness, I want sin."/"In fact,
said Mustapha Mond, "you're claiming the right to be
unhappy."/
"All right, then," said the Savage defiantly, "I'm claiming
the right to be unhappy" [18].
More recently, C. S. Lewis (1953/1970) warned: "Of all
the tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of
the victims may be the most oppressive ... To be 'cured'
against one's will and cured of states which we may not
even regard as disease is to be put on a level with those
who have not yet reached the age of reason or those who
never will; to be classed with infants, imbeciles, and
domestic animals. For if crime and disease are to be
regarded as the same thing, it follows that any state of
mind which our masters choose to call 'disease' can be
treated as a crime; and compulsorily cured. Even if the
treatment is painful, even if it is life-long, even if it is fatal,
that will be only a regrettable accident; the intention was
purely therapeutic [19].
In our own day (1986), Argentinean novelist Adolfo Bioy
Casares observed: "Well then, maybe it would be worth
mentioning the three periods of history. When man
believed that happiness was dependent upon God, he
killed for religious reasons. When he believed that happi-
ness was dependent upon the form of government, he
killed for political reasons. ... After dreams that were too
long, true nightmares. ... we arrived at the present period
of history. Man woke up, discovered that which we always
knew, that happiness is dependent upon health, and
began to kill for therapeutic reasons. ... It is medicine that
has come to replace both religion and politics in our time"
[20].
I have asserted that Secular Humanism is incompatible
with the principles and practices of psychiatry. However, I
do not speak for Secular Humanism. Those who do must
decide whether that decision is well-founded or not. I ask
only that the decision-makers keep in mind two things: 1)
The paradigmatic practices of psychiatry are civil commit-
ment and insanity defense – that is, depriving innocent
persons of liberty and excusing guilty persons of their
crimes – and that the consequences of both are confine-
ment in institutions ostensibly devoted to the treatment
of mental diseases. 2) Black's Law Dictionary states: "Every
confinement of the person is an 'imprisonment,' whether
it be in a common prison, or in private house, or in the
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